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A comparison based on German and French micro data shows that the
redistributive effects of family support provided in the form of tax relief are
stronger in Germany than in France. This is true both for redistribution
between households of different sizes and for redistribution between house-
holds with different incomes. The average burden on single individuals
without children compared to other types of household is larger in Germany
than in France. Couples with one, two, or three children bear a compara-
tively lower burden in Germany than in France. For couples with four or
more children, the relative income-tax burden is the same in the two coun-
tries. Overall, all German households with children bear a below-average
share of the income-tax burden, while in France this applies only to lone
parents and to couples with three or more children. In France, therefore,
there is a greater degree of redistribution than in Germany from households
consisting of couples with one or two children to households that have three
or more children.
The study also revealed differences in the redistributive effects related
to the amount of household income. In all households with children, the bur-
den is much lower (or the relief obtained is much higher) in the bottom five
deciles in Germany than in France. Only couples with children who are in
the top two deciles (or in the top three deciles in the case of couples with
three children) enjoy greater relief under the French system than their coun-
terparts in Germany.
For a long time, family policy has been more of a peripheral question in
the political debate in Germany, but issues relating to family policy have
recently been gaining increasing priority. One important reason is the fact
that family policy in Germany _ despite the substantial amount of public
funds spent on it compared to other countries2 _ performs less well with
respect to a range of indicators than the family policy of other European
1   This article is based on a report drawn up by DIW Berlin on behalf of the Hans Böckler
Foundation: Alexandre Baclet, Fabien Dell, Viktor Steiner, and Katharina Wrohlich: 'Vertei-
lungseffekte der staatlichen Familienförderung _ Ein empirischer Vergleich zwischen Deutsch-
land und Frankreich'. Berlin 2005.
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countries. Indicators that deserve particular mention in
this respect are the low birthrate and the low share of
working mothers.3 Contributors to the public debate
often cite France, whose income-tax system and supply
of state-funded child-care facilities are believed to be
particularly supportive of families. France is seen as an
example of a country with a 'successful family policy'
because both its fertility rate and the share of working
mothers in its labor force are higher than in Germany
and, in particular, because childlessness is less common
there amongst highly qualified women than in Ger-
many.4 French family policy differs from German family
policy in many respects, ranging from the supply of sub-
sidized child-care facilities and the design of the regula-
tions on parental leave benefits to the family policy com-
ponents of the income-tax system.5
The focal point of this report is a comparison
between the redistributive effects engendered in Ger-
many and France by the different tax treatment of fami-
lies with children. The German instruments concerned
are child benefits (Kindergeld) and the tax-free allow-
ance for dependent children (Kinderfreibetrag); the
French measures are the 'family splitting' procedure in
the calculation of income tax and family allowances
(Allocations Familiales). If a comparison of the relief pro-
vided by these measures is to yield useful information,
then it must, on principle, also take account of the empir-
ical income distribution and of the different definitions
of taxable income. This is particularly important in the
context of a Franco-German comparison because there
are some substantial differences in the definitions of tax-
able income used in the two countries. Having compared
the tax treatment of families in France and Germany,
the results of the empirical analysis of the effective aver-
age tax burden or amount of tax relief will then be pre-
sented; the analysis is based on the year 2001 because
more recent data are not yet available for France.
Comparison of Family Income Taxation 
in France and Germany
Income-tax schedules in France and Germany
A comparison of the German and French income-tax
schedules shows that the average burden follows a simi-
lar trajectory in the two countries, although the rates dif-
fer (cf. figure 1). The average tax rate in 2001 for a tax-
able income of euro 10 000 amounted to around 6% in
Germany, compared to 7% in France; for a taxable
income of euro 20 000, the figure was 16% in Germany,
compared to 17% in France. Overall, however, the aver-
age burden rises at a sharper rate in France than in Ger-
many. For an income of euro 55 000, which belongs to
the highest tax bracket in both countries, the average
burden in Germany is around 31%, compared to 35% in
France. This indicates that the French schedule is more
progressive than that applied in Germany.
The household is the relevant unit for income tax
purposes in both Germany and France. Married couples6
are taxed jointly and children are taken into account in
the calculation of the amount of tax payable. This prin-
ciple stands in contrast with the system of individual
taxation practiced in the Scandinavian countries, and
also in Austria and the United Kingdom.7 The income-
splitting system also applies to married couples without
children in both France and Germany (cf. box 1).
The tax treatment of children
France and Germany have different regulations regard-
ing the ways in which children are taken into consider-
ation for income tax purposes. In Germany, parents are
entitled to child benefits (Kindergeld) for each child.
This amounted in 2001 to euro 138 each per month for
the first and the second child, to euro 154 for the third
child, and to euro 179 for the fourth and each subse-
quent child. The total annual child benefit per child
therefore amounted to euro 1656 each for the first and
the second child, euro 1848 for the third child, and
euro 2148 for the fourth and each subsequent child. Par-
2  Cf. Bert Rürup and Sandra Gruescu: 'Nachhaltige Familienpolitik im
Interesse einer aktiven Bevölkerungsentwicklung'. A report on behalf
of the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women,
and Youth. Berlin 2003.
3  Cf. Mechthild Veil: 'Erklärt die gesellschaftliche Verankerung franzö-
sischer Familienpolitik die steigenden Geburtenraten und die hohe
Müttererwerbstätigkeit?' In: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung: Auslandsin-
formationen, 1/2004, pp. 4-25
4  Cf. Jeanne Fagnani: 'Les Français font toujours plus d'enfants que les
Allemandes de l'Ouest.' In: Recherches et Prévisions, no. 64, 2001,
pp. 49-63.
5  Cf. Jeanne Fagnani, loc. cit.; Corinna Onnen-Isemann: 'Familienpoli-
tik und Fertilitätsunterschiede in Europa. Frankreich und Deutsch-
land.' In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B44/2003, pp. 31-38; Mecht-
hild Veil: 'Kinderbetreuungskulturen in Europa: Schweden, Frank-
reich, Deutschland.' In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B44/2003,
pp.12-22; Mechthild Veil 2004, loc. cit.
6  While in Germany the system of joint income taxation (Ehegatten-
splitting) only applies to married couples, in France unmarried couples
who have signed a Civil Solidarity Pact (Pacte Civil de Solidarité _
PACS) can also be jointly taxed and use the income-splitting proce-
dure.
7  In the case of individual taxation, each partner's income is taxed sep-
arately and the income of the other partner is given no consideration
whatsoever in the calculation of the tax liable. In accordance with this
system, most countries with individual taxation regimes provide sup-
port for children not in the form of tax concessions but as non-means-
tested transfers.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 31/2005  351
ents in Germany are also entitled to a tax allowance for
dependent children (which includes an allowance for
child-care expenses); this amounted to euro 5112 per
child in 2001. The child benefit and the tax allowance for
children are not granted concomitantly, rather the so-
called higher-yield test is applied: if the amount of tax
saved by means of the tax allowance is higher than the
amount of the child benefit, then the tax allowance is
applied. In the case of families with one child, the reduc-
tion in the tax burden by means of the tax allowance
Figure 1
Income-Tax Schedules in France and Germany, 2001: Marginal Burden and Average Burden
DIW Berlin 2005
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Income splitting for married couples
Income splitting for married couples (Ehegattensplitting)
entails summing the incomes of the two spouses and dividing
the result by two. The income-tax schedule is applied to this
amount and the resulting tax payable is then doubled. The
income splitting formula can be expressed as follows:
where T is the household's tax payable, k is what is known as
the splitting coefficient, t is the tax rate, and w are the income
components of the i individual members of the household. In
the case of married couples without children, the splitting
coefficient k is equal to 2 in both Germany and France. The
tax rate t is the same for married couples and single adults in
both countries. When a household's income is split unequally
between the two partners, under the system of progressive
income-tax rates this formula results in a lower tax burden
than if the two individuals were taxed separately. This is why
public policy debates on this issue often speak of a 'splitting
gain.'
The amount of the gain yielded by the income-splitting proce-
dure depends on three factors: the degree of progression of
the income-tax schedule, the distribution of income within the
household, and the total income of the household. Because
Germany and France's income-tax schedules are very similar,
the amount and the progression of the splitting gain are also
very similar in the two countries. The system is of the greatest
benefit in both cases to those married couples in which a sin-
gle earner takes home a taxable income of over euro 100 000
per annum. In these households, joint taxation using the
income splitting system leads to a 'gain' of about euro 10 000
per annum compared to a system of separate taxation. As the
gap between the incomes of the two spouses decreases, this
gain diminishes. The splitting gain is minimal for married cou-
ples whose incomes are approximately equal or whose joint
income is very large.1
1  An illustration of the progression of the splitting gain in Germany and
France can be found in Alexandre Baclet et al., loc. cit. The effects of
income splitting on revenue and income distribution in Germany are
described in detail in Stefan Bach et al., 'Untersuchung zu den Wirkun-
gen der gegenwärtigen Ehegattenbesteuerung'. Project report for the
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was larger than the amount of the child benefit for
annual taxable incomes of euro 55 000 and upwards.
The maximum amount of relief by means of the tax
allowance was obtained in that year by families with a
taxable income of over euro 110 000, for whom it
amounted to almost euro 2500 per child per annum.8
In France, unlike in Germany, the amount of child
benefits  (Allocations familiales) received is staggered
according to the age of the child. There is also a higher
increase in the benefit than in Germany as the number
of children increases. Child benefits in France are only
granted from the second child onwards. In 2001, it
amounted to euro 107 per month (euro 1284 per annum)
for the second child, and to euro 137 per month
(euro 1644 per annum) for the third and each subse-
quent child. The benefit was increased in 2001 by
euro 30 per month for children aged 11 to 15, and by
euro 54 per month for children aged 16 and over. In
addition, a means-tested supplement to the child benefit
(Complément Familial) is paid for the third and each
subsequent child. This supplement amounted to
euro 140 per month in 2001 and was granted to families
with a taxable income of maximum euro 24 545.
In addition to these transfers children in France are
also taken into account in the calculation of income tax
by means of the family splitting procedure (Quotient
familial), whereby the splitting coefficient (cf. box 1)
increases as the number of children rises. The coefficient
is increased by 0.5 each for the first and the second
child, and by 1 each for the third and each subsequent
child. This means that the calculation of the tax liability
of a married couple with two children, for example, is
based on a splitting coefficient of 3, whereas for a mar-
ried couple with three children, the splitting coefficient
is 4. The maximum amount of relief obtained in 2001 on
the basis of the family splitting procedure was subject to
a ceiling of euro 2017 each per annum for the first and
second child, and of euro 4034 each per annum for the
third and each subsequent child. Unlike in Germany,
child benefits and tax relief by means of the family split-
ting system are granted concomitantly in France. Box 2
summarizes the most important regulations governing
the tax treatment of married couples, lone parents, and
children.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative effect of the child
benefits benefits and tax relief for the first, second, and
third child in relation to the amount of taxable income.
The amount of relief obtained is larger in Germany than
in France for all families9 in the lower income brackets.
Households with one child and a taxable income of up to
euro 50 000 per annum benefit more from these instru-
ments in Germany than in France. The reason is that in
France the first child is not entitled to child benefits;
moreover, the relief obtained from the family splitting
system only takes effect with higher incomes. Families
with two children and with a taxable income of up to
euro 35 000 per annum also enjoy more relief in Ger-
many than in France. Only in the case of higher incomes
does the French family splitting procedure lead to
higher relief than the German system.
The tax relief provided by means of the French fam-
ily splitting procedure can be very substantial for high-
income households. A family with two children in
France and with a taxable annual income of euro 60 000
receives support of euro 5318, compared to only
euro 3370 in Germany. French families with three chil-
dren and with a taxable income of euro 15 000 upwards
benefit more than equivalent families in Germany.
Thanks to the means-tested supplement to child benefits
8  On this point also cf. Jörg Althammer: 'Familienbesteuerung _ Refor-
men ohne Ende?' In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung,
vol. 71, no. 1, 2002, pp. 67-82.
9  This figure only shows the effect on the tax burden of two-parent
families. The effects for lone parents are described in detail in Alexan-
dre Baclet et al., loc. cit.
Figure 2
Reduction in Burden for Households with 
Children in France and Germany via Tax Relief 
and Transfer Benefits
Euros per annum
Sources: Enquête Revenus Fiscaux 2001; German Socio-Economic Panel 2002;
calculations by the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies
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granted for the third and subsequent children, the relief
enjoyed by families with a taxable income of
euro 26 000, for example, is almost euro 1300 higher per
annum in France than in Germany.
The higher the family income, the higher the relief
obtained through the family splitting system. Because in
France the splitting coefficient is twice as large for the
third as for the first child, while in Germany the tax
allowance is the same for all children, there are substan-
tial differences in the tax relief granted to high-income
families with three children. The maximum amount of
relief through family splitting for a family with three
children in France is around euro 11 000 per annum, and
this is obtained by families with a taxable income of
euro 70 000 upwards. The tax relief for a family with
three children in this income bracket in Germany is
euro 5400, in other words only around half the amount
of support provided in France.
Comparison of relief effects on the 
basis of micro data
While a comparison of the French and German tax regu-
lations with respect to the family context yields impor-
tant insights about the way in which the two systems
work, it takes no account of the fact that, in addition to
the income-tax schedule, the definition of taxable income
also has an important influence on the actual redistribu-
tive effects of a tax system. Given that there is a consid-
erable difference between the French and German defini-
tions of taxable income,10 a comparison of family sup-
port mechanisms must be carried out on the basis of a
comparable concept of gross income. In addition, the
progressive structure of the income-tax schedule in
France is weakened by a proportional tax on income
Principal regulations governing tax treatment of married couples, lone parents, and 
children in France and Germany1
France Germany
Married couples Joint taxation with income splitting, splitting coefficient = 2.
Lone parents Income splitting, splitting coefficient = 1.5. 
However, the splitting gain is limited to a 
maximum euro 1473 per annum.
Household tax allowance for lone parents 
of euro 2780 per annum.
Children: tax treatment Family splitting: The family splitting coeffi-
cient increases by 0.5 each for the first and 
second child and by 1 each for the third 
and each subsequent child. The splitting 
gain for the first and second child is 
capped at euro 2017 per annum; the cap 
for the third and each subsequent child is 
set at euro 4034 per annum.
Tax allowance for dependent children of 
euro 5112 per annum (including allowance 
for child-care expenses).
Children: Transfers
First child –  Euro 1656 per annum.
Second child  Euro 1284 per annum  Euro 1656 per annum.
Third child  Euro 1644 per annum  Euro 1843 per annum.
Fourth and each subsequent child  Euro 1644 per annum  Euro 2148 per annum.
Supplement for children aged 11+  Euro  360 per annum –
Supplement for children aged 16+  Euro  648 per annum –
Means-tested supplement 
from third child onwards
 Euro 1654 per annum
–
Transfer benefits and tax relief via family 
splitting are granted concomitantly.
Families are eligible only for one or other 
of transfer benefits or tax relief via the tax 
allowance for children.2
1 Data from 2001. — 2 The full amount of child benefits in Germany is not a transfer benefit but a fictitious tax allowance for dependent children
of families whose income exceeds the basic allowance (Grundfreibetrag); cf. Jörg Althammer 2002, loc. cit. Child benefits are referred to here as
a transfer benefit only for the purposes of simplification.
Box 2
10  Unlike in Germany, pensions and unemployment benefit, for exam-
ple, are fully taxed in France.354 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 31/2005
(Contribution Sociale Généralisée _ CSG). This tax is
also taken into account in the empirical analysis, as is
the German solidarity surcharge (Solidaritätszuschlag).
Moreover, the differences in the distribution of
incomes must also be taken into account. For example,
the fact that France has a higher maximum tax rate tells
us nothing about the actual redistributive effects of the
tax system if fewer households are taxed at this rate
than in Germany. This is why an analysis seeking to
ascertain which types of household benefit to what
extent from family support in the two systems must also
take account of the empirical distribution of comparable
gross incomes. The empirical analysis of the actual
average burden on families with children is based on
separate representative micro data sets for Germany
and France.11 DIW Berlin's STSM microsimulation
model12 is used to formulate comparative definitions of
pre-tax and post-tax income in the two countries.13
Redistribution between households of different size
A comparison of the average pre-tax and post-tax
incomes of different household types in France shows
that, on average, lone parents with two or more children
and couples with four or more children gain income
through family support based on fiscal measures, while
all other households suffer income losses. These losses
are most substantial for childless singles and are lowest
for couples with three children (cf. table 1). In Germany,
too, lone parents with two or more children benefit on
average in the form of income gains from the system of
family support through fiscal instruments. The income
of couples with four or more children does not change,
on average, as a result of fiscal measures. As in France,
all other household types are, on average, 'net payers'
(cf. table 2).
A Franco-German comparison must take into
account the fact that the average income-tax burden is
higher in Germany than in France. Average post-tax
income in Germany amounts to 82% of pre-tax income,
compared to 88% in France. The reason is that income
tax in France accounts for a smaller share of total tax
revenue than in Germany.14
As a result, it proves more informative to compare
each difference on the basis of its deviation from the
mean. Then it becomes evident that, compared to the
average, childless singles bear a greater burden in Ger-
many than in France.15 In other words, there is more
redistribution in general in Germany from childless sin-
11  The database for Germany is the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP),
which is a representative annual survey of private households in Ger-
many carried out by DIW Berlin in collaboration with the Infratest
Social Research Institute. Detailed information on the SOEP can be
found on DIW Berlin's web site (www.diw.de/sop). The analysis of the
French situation is based on the Tax Revenue Survey (Enquête Reve-
nus Fiscaux _ ERF). This database consists of individual income-tax
data combined with figures from the French Labor Market Survey.
These data, which provide information on 75 000 households, are com-
piled by the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic
Studies (INSEE) together with the tax department of the French Minis-
try of Finance (DGI).
12  For a detailed presentation and documentation of the STSM micro-
simulation model, cf. Viktor Steiner, Peter Haan, and Katharina
Wrohlich: 'Dokumentation des Steuer-Transfer-Simulationsmodells
(STSM)'. Mimeo. Berlin 2005.
13  A detailed description of the data and the procedure used to con-
struct comparable pre-tax and post-tax incomes can be found in
Alexandre Baclet et al., loc. cit.
Table 1
Average Pre-Tax and Post-Tax Income in France
Household type
Pre-tax income Post-tax income
Post-tax income 
as % of pre-tax income
Deviation from average 
in percentage points
Euro per annum
Childless singles 17 694 15 461 87 -1
Lone parents with one child 19 359 17 188 89 +1
Lone parents with two or more children 18 288 18 721 102 +14
Childless couples 33 668 29 035 86 -2
Couples with one child 40 758 34 664 85 -3
Couples with two children 41 637 36 874 89 0
Couples with three children 38 369 37 073 97 +8
Couples with four or more children 33 188 35 176 106 +18
Average of percentage change x x 88 x
Sources: Enquête Revenus Fiscaux 2001; calculations by the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE).
14  Cf. OECD: 'Revenue Statistics. Special Feature: Accrual Reporting in
Revenue Statistics 1965-2003'. Paris 2004.
15  However, this analysis did not take account of means-tested transfer
benefits in France, for example the lone parent allowance (Allocation
de Parent Isolé _ API).DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 31/2005  355
gles to households with children. The burden on lone
parents is reduced to a greater extent, comparatively, in
Germany than in France. It is also worth noting that in
Germany all couples with children bear a below-average
burden, whereas this only applies in France to couples
with three or more children. In France, therefore, there is
a greater degree of redistribution from couples with one
or two children to couples with three or more children
than in Germany.
Redistribution within one household type
Figure 3 shows the effects of family support through tax
relief for selected types of households in Germany and
France. Up to the seventh decile, lone parents with one
child are granted more relief in Germany than in France,
that is, 70% of all families living in this type of house-
hold are given greater support under the German sys-
tem of family burden-sharing or benefit-sharing than in
France. The differences in the amount of relief granted
in Germany and France are less significant for couples
with two or three children. Nonetheless, it is evident in
both cases that the curve of the relief effects has a much
steeper trajectory in Germany than in France: Low-
income households enjoy more relief than in France,
while wealthier households bear a greater burden.
All in all, there is a greater degree of redistribution
in Germany than in France as a result of the income-tax
system and its family policy components. Measured in
terms of the Gini coefficient,16 the inequality of pre-tax
income distribution is similar in Germany and France.
The differences in the distribution of post-tax income
are smaller in Germany for all household types than in
France. In contrast to the expected result based on a
comparison of the two countries' tax schedules, the
empirical analysis shows that there is more redistribu-
tion in Germany than in France, both between house-
holds of different sizes and between households with
different incomes. If Germany were to adopt the French
system of income taxation and its tax treatment of chil-
dren, the beneficiaries of a reform of this kind would be
couples with children in the top two deciles of the pre-
tax income distribution. This would not only be a result
of the different tax treatment of children, however, but
also of the different definition of taxable income and of
the 'dilution' of the progressive income-tax schedule in
France by means of the proportional CSG.
Assessment and conclusions for policy
An evaluation of the two systems of tax treatment of
families with children depends on the goals of family
policy. Traditionally, the most important aim of German
family policy has been to create 'income equality'
between families with children and individuals without
children by means of financial support.17 The joint tax
assessment of married couples by means of income
splitting and the tax allowance for dependent children
are instruments geared towards this objective. More-
over, child benefits serves to provide a portion of the
subsistence minimum for each child, regardless of the
Table 2
Average Pre-Tax and Post-Tax Income in Germany
Household type
Pre-tax income Post-tax income
Post-tax income 
as % of pre-tax income
Deviation from average 
in percentage points
Euro per annum
Childless singles 20 100 15 965 79 -3
Lone parents with one child 16 958 15 980 94 +12
Lone parents with two or more children 14 624 16 580 113 +31
Childless couples 35 311 28 646 81 -1
Couples with one child 41 033 34 446 84 +1
Couples with two children 45 301 39 128 86 +4
Couples with three children 41 057 38 218 93 +11
Couples with four or more children 40 550 40 676 100 +18
Average of percentage change x x 82 x
Sources: German Socio-Economic Panel 2002; DIW Berlin calculations.
16  The Gini coefficient is used to measure the inequality of income dis-
tribution. It is calculated as the ratio of the area enclosed between the
'equality diagonal' (45°) and the Lorenz curve to the total area under
the diagonal. In the event of entirely equal distribution, the Gini coeffi-
cient is 0; it rises to a maximum value of 1 as inequality increases.
17  Cf. Jörg Althammer: 'Ökonomische Theorie der Familienpolitik.
Theoretische und empirische Befunde zu ausgewählten Problemen
staatlicher Familienpolitik'. Heidelberg 2000.356 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 31/2005
family's income. Child benefits have been taken into
account in the family burden-sharing system of taxation
since 1996, however, in the sense that is offset against
the relief effect of the tax allowance for dependent chil-
dren. The empirical analysis presented here shows that
the German system of 'dual family burden-sharing' com-
bined with the system of income taxation results in
more equality in income distribution between house-
holds of different types, but also between households of
the same type and different incomes (vertical redistribu-
tion) than does the French system.
French policy makers have traditionally given
greater priority to population goals and to the reconcilia-
tion of family and working life. The pursuit of these
aims explains why the relief provided through the fam-
ily policy components of income taxation rises more
sharply than in Germany as the number of children
increases. Nonetheless, it is not yet possible to infer a
causal relationship from the correlation between the
higher fertility rate and the stronger progression in the
French system of family support as the number of chil-
dren increases. In addition to the tax treatment of chil-
dren, numerous other factors also correlate with the
higher fertility rates, for instance the availability of
child-care facilities.
There are a number of signs that family policy goals
have changed in recent years in Germany and will per-
haps change even further. The concept of 'sustainable
family policy'18 identifies the birthrate, the reconciliation
of family and working life, and the prevention of family
poverty as important indicators that should guide fam-
ily policy. Child benefits may increase household
income, but it cannot compensate for the loss of earned
income. The tax allowance for dependent children
favors high-income families, because the amount of
relief increases as taxable income rises. Improved sup-
port in the area of child care as well as easier means to
deduct the costs of child care in income-tax returns are
measures that promise more success with respect to the
goals defined above, especially the reconciliation of
work and family and consequently also the prevention
of family poverty.19
Figure 3
Effective Average Burden or Relief in 
France and Germany
Note: The points in the diagram represent the median pre-tax income and the median
effective average burden for each decile.
Sources: Enquête Revenus Fiscaux 2001; German Socio-Economic Panel 2002; cal-
culations by the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies
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18  Cf. Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women,
and Youth (BMFSFJ): 'Bevölkerungsorientierte Familienpolitik _  Ein
Wachstumsfaktor', Berlin 2004; Malte Ristau: 'Der ökonomische
Charme der Familie.' In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 23-24/2005,
pp. 16-23.
19  Cf. C. Katharina Spiess and Felix Büchel: 'Effekte der regionalen
Kindergarteninfrastruktur auf das Arbeitsangebot von Müttern.' In:
W. Schmähl (ed.): 'Soziale Sicherung und Arbeitsmarkt'. Schriften des
Vereins für Socialpolitik, vol. 294, Berlin 2003; Katharina Wrohlich:
'Child Care Costs and Mothers _ Labor Supply: An Empirical Analysis
for Germany'. DIW Discussion Papers, no. 412, Berlin 2004.